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1. Introduction
In developed countries, compulsory education is taken for granted as
an essential public service. Education contributes to economic growth
through forming individual human capital, promoting technological
progress and so on. Furthermore, it serves for individuals to acquire
fundamental learning skills. Then, compulsory education is regarded as
one of the basic policy measures to realize economic growth and equal
income distribution, and to achieve a stable and democratic society.
In economics literature on education, government interference in
individual educational choice is justified by such economic factors as
externalities [Weisbrod (1964), Pauly (1970)], the income redistribution
effect [Hamada (1975), Bruno (1976), Ulph (1977)], and the achievement
of economic efficiency [Welch (1970)]. In this paper, we focus on the
intergenerational externalities, using an overlapping generation model.
We assume here that parents make decisions on their educational
expenditures for children on the basis of the so-called joy of giving
motivation, and that parents' decisions have intergenerational
externalities. That is, though education for children has influences upon
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their human capital formation and future income, parents make decisions
based on their own preferences for children's education rather than on
their children's future welfare. It has been pointed out that parents'
decisions based on these motivations yield insufficient amount of
education [Eckstein and Zilcha (1994)]. Then government educational
policies may be required to improve the situation.
In our model, we assume compulsory education which is provided for
all individuals commonly as a government educational policy, and also
assume that the individuals can purchase private education in addition to
public education ifthey wish [Hare and Ulph (1979)].' Since in our model
decisions on children's education are made by parents, parents' incomes
and preferences for education have a critical influence upon children's
human capital formation as well as public education. This characterizes
the accumulation process of human capital through generations in each
family. Recently, Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) analyzed the role of
compulsory education, and showed that it enhances economic growth and
makes the distribution of earnings more equal. We will discuss how
introduction of compulsory public education affects human capital
accumulation and income distribution among heterogeneous individuals.
We also consider threshold effects in the accumulation process of human
capital [Azariadis and Drazen (1990)], and examine how public education
changes the accumulation process ofhuman capital in the long run.
The remainder ofthe paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a basic model of individual decisions on private education and section 3
introduces the government to provide public education. Section 4 analyzes
the long-run effects of public education on the level of individual human
capital and the income distribution. Finally concluding comments follows
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in section 5.
2. Decisions on private education
2. 1 A basic model
We consider an overlapping generation economy in which an
individual lives for two periods, receiving education in the first period (the
period of childhood) and working in the second period (the period of
parenthood). An individual, who has a child at the beginning of parent
period, works for money, and makes a decision on education given to the
child during that period. We assume that there is no population growth in
the economy.
An individual who works in the t -period is called as t -generation
and is assumed to have the following utility function:
(1)
where c, is the consumption of t-generation which includes the
consumption of his / her child, and a,+l and E,+! are the bequest and the
educational expenditures for t + 1 generation, respectively. We assume
that the utility function has positive marginal utility with respect to each
argument and is quasi-concave. This utility function implies that an
individual has the joy of giving motivation for education and bequest to
his / her offsprings! Individuals have different utility functions identified
by parameter (J. This parameter (J denotes an infinite sequence of
individuals: more precisely each of them expresses a family (a parent
and a child). In our model, the parameter stands for the degree of
preference for education, and that a larger (J means a higher preference
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for education, i. e., UE8 > o. The preference parameter 0 is distributed with
a density function !(O) which satisfies !(O) ~ 0 for 0 < fl ~ 0 ~ "9 < 00 and
J!(O)d 0 == I."
Individuals spend income on education and bequest for their children
as well as on consumption. A budget constraint of an individual of t -
generation is expressed as
(2)
where Wt is the wage rate, r, the interest rate in period t, ht(O) the level of
human capital, and a,(O) the bequest left by a parent (t - 1generation).
We assume that an individual's labor supply is inelastic and proportional
to his / her human capital.' Assuming the proportional coefficient to be
unity, the amount of labor supply is expressed by h,(O) in an efficiency
unit. The left hand side of eq. (2) means that an individual earns the wage
income, Wth,(O), and receives the bequest with an interest on that,
(l + r,)at(O). Representing the income of an individual 0 by z,(O), i.e.,
z, (0) == wth, (0) +(l + r, )a, (0) , eq. (2) is rewritten as
(3)
An individual is assumed to choose c" at+! and E'+l so as to maximize the
utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) with at+l given. The first
order conditions are obtained for each 0 as follows:
UC/ - At == 0,
ua/+1 - At == 0,
UE/+l - At == 0,
z,(O) == c, + Et+l + at+!,
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where A, is the Lagrangean multiplier, and Uc/ == 8u/8c" uo/+! == 8u/8at+l,
UE/+! == 8u/8Et+l. Solving the above eqs. (4)-(7), the following demand
functions can be obtained:
c,(O) "" c(z,(Wt, r"h,(O),a,(O»; 0),
a,+l(O) "" a (z, (w, , r"h,(O),a,(O»;O),
Et+l(O) "" E(z,(w"r"h,(O),a,(O»;O).
(8)
(9)
(10)
We assume that all the goods and services are normal goods.
The total human capital of the economy has direct effects, together
with the physical capital stock, upon production possibilities. The
production function ofthe economy is defined as
Y, "" F(K"H,), (11)
where Y" K, and H, are total output, physical and human capitals in
period t, respectively. The production function is assumed to have positive
marginal products, to be quasi-concave and to be homogeneous of degree
one with respect to both inputs. We assume the supply of capital consists
of the only assets, which have been left for the following generation as
bequest. Then the capital market clearance requires that the capital
should be equal to the sum of individual assets. Denoting the total
population by N, K, and Ht are expressed as K, "" N I at (O)!(O)d 0 = Na,
and Ht = NIh, (O)!(O)d 0 = N ht , where a, and ht are the average amount of
individual physical capital and that of human capital, respectively. Using
these symbols, the production function is rewritten in a per capita form:
Yt = F(a, ,h,), (12)
where Y, is per capita output. Assuming that the market is competitive,
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each input is paid its marginal products: r, = Fa" and w, = Fh,.
In equilibrium, the following market clearance condition must hold
for output :
51, +a, = c, +E'+1 +a'+I, (13)
where c, == Jc, (O)!(O)d 0 and £'+1 == JE,+I(O)!(O)d 0 are the average amount
of consumption and that of education in period t, respectively.
An individual human capital is accumulated in the educational
process during his / her first period. We assume that the attained stock of
human capital depends on the parent's level of human capital as well as
the amount of education, which is given in childhood. Then the function of
human capital formation is expressed as
(14)
where a given function 'ljJ is assumed to have positive derivatives with
respect to both parameters and to be concave with respect to h,(O).' The
factor A represents the efficiency in human capital accumulation. We
assume that the efficiency in human capital accumulation increases with
a parent's human capital and that there are threshold effects in
accumulation process as Azariadis and Drazen (1990) did.' This means
that education works more efficiently on human capital formation if a
parent's human capital is not less than a certain level. To capture this
nature of accumulation process, we define the scale factor function as :
A (Mo» = £t for h, (0) < h *,
A (h,(O» = A for h,(O) ::::: h *,
(15)
(16)
where tl and A are given positive constant parameters, and tl < A. Eqs.
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(15) and (16) mean that the scale factor function jumps at h·.7 That is, h·
is a critical point which may cause radical differences in dynamic
accumulation processes of human capital.' We assume in addition that
individuals have the identical function of human capital formation, and
then that the critical point is also the same for all individuals. We call this
point the threshold point.
2. 2 Dynamic process
The dynamic accumulation processes of human and physical capitals
are described by the following two difference equations:
ht+l((J) = A (ht(())'ljJ(Et+l(Z, ((J), (J), hr«(J»,
at+l«(J) = a (Zt«(J), (J).
(17)
(18)
Since our system has threshold effects in eq. (17) , we have a unique or
two equilibrium states corresponding to the scale factors £l and if as will
be explained in section 2. 3. Also, we assume that these equilibria are
locally stable in a neighborhood of each equilibrium (see Appendix).
Restricting our concern to steady states, we can obtain equilibrium
states for each individual by solving the dynamic system (17) and (18). Eq.
(13) is automatically satisfied because of the budget constraint of each
individual. It is not assured whether the individual's human capital is
increasing or decreasing with (J in the long run. However, when the
positive relation between educational preference and the demand for
education is assumed, we can verify that under certain conditions, in a
steady state the level of human capital and that of income both increase
but the amount of bequest decreases with (J.9 In the discussion below, we
will restrict our attentions to this case where dh«(J)/d(J > 0, dZ«(J)/d(J > 0
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and da«(})/d () < 0 in a neighborhood of equilibria for the same scale factor.
2. 3 Threshold and steady states
We examine the threshold effect in the human capital formation
function. Fixing the level of bequest at a certain equilibrium level a*, we
can derive a potential equilibrium point for any () corresponding to each
scale factor A. and A regardless of a threshold point (see Fig. 1). Then we
define the lower potential equilibrium point !L«(}) of the human capital
formation function with scale factor A., and the higher one h«(}) with A.
According to where the threshold point h * is, we can classify individuals
into three cases as follows:
Case I. h' < !L«(}) < h «(})
In this case, the steady state is unique. Every human capital
accumulation path converges to the steady state h«(}), regardless of the
initial stock of individual's human capital. This case is shown in Fig. 2.
Case II. !L«(}):::; h * :::; h «(})
In this case, two steady states can be in equilibrium. It is the initial
stock of human capital that decides which steady state will be realized. If
the initial stock is below h *, the accumulation path converges to the lower
steady state lL«(}). On the other hand, if the initial stock is equal to or
above h', the path converges to the higher steady state h«(}). See Fig. 3.
Case ill. !L«(}) < h«(}) < h *
In this case, the steady state is unique. Every human capital
accumulation path converges to the steady state !L«(}), regardless of the
-8-
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initial stock of individual's human capital. See Fig. 4.
Since the human capital formation function for the same scale factor
shifts upward with educational preference () by assumption, Case I is
likely to be applied to individuals with a higher preference for education,
Case nto individuals with a middle preference and Case III to individuals
with a lower preference. We call the group of individuals in Case I the
45"
for A(h(IJ))=A
for A(h(IJ))=A
f!(IJ)
45"
J..-......r.--- A
..........._ A
"'-------'--------'------='-------h
h* IJ(IJ) h(lJ)
Fig. 2
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h.•• 45"
Li-o-------,---.-- A
h*
"'---------'-,--'---==--'---~h.
/1..(8) h* h(8)
Fig. 3
__~A
/~_,*"_:' ---- A
"------'----~'---=---'---- h.
IJ(IJ) h(8)
Fig. 4
higher preference group, those in Case II the middle preference group, and
similarly those in Case ill the lower preference group.
In both higher and lower preference groups, in the long run, the
individuals with the higher preference attain the higher level of human
capital than the individuals with the lower preference, regardless of the
initial level of human capital. In the middle preference group, however, it
is possible that the order of individual preference for education is not
consistent with the order of the level of attained human capital. In other
-10-
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words, even if the individual has a relatively higher preference for
education, the attained human capital is possibly lower than that of
individual with a relatively lower preference. It is because, in the case of
the middle preference group, the initial level of human capital is critical
in deciding which equilibrium is attained in the accumulation path.
3. The public provision of education
As stated in the above, a parent chooses the amount of education for
his / her child in accordance with his / her own preference for education.
In this case, the allocation of education is not socially optimum since the
parent disregards the effects of education on future income and utility of
his/her child. Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) showed that the decision of
parents yields socially the under-investment in education and the
government supply of education can improve the efficiency.
We introduce a government educational policy into the economy to
improve the efficiency, in which the government imposes the
comprehensive proportional income tax and spends the revenue on the
provision of public education. Public education is assumed to be
compulsory and provided for all individuals free of charge.
We examine the consumer's behavior in the presence of public
education. Individuals may purchase education privately in addition to
public education if they wish. For individuals, public education is
regarded as a transfer in kind. Then we define ze' (0) as the individual's
after - tax income including a transfer in kind;
zf(0)=(l-a,)[w,ht(0)+(l+rt)a,(0)]+8t+!, where a, is an income tax
rate, 8'+1 public education per family supplied for the t + I generation.1O
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Et+l({l)in the previous section is reinterpreted here as the total
expenditures on education which are the sum of public and private
education. Then private education desired by individuals is expressed as
(Et+1- gt+1). An Individual's demand functions are:
Ct«(}) = c(z,e(wt,r"ht,at,gt+I,at );(}),
at+l «(}) = a (z,' (Wt, r" hI! a" gt+I, at); (}),
E'+I«(}) = E(z,e(Wt,rt,ht,a"gt+I, a,); (}).
(19)
(20)
(21)
For individuals who do not spend on private education, the total
education equals public education, i. e., Et+l«(}) = gt+1.
The government budget constraint is expressed as
(22)
The dynamic accumulation processes of human and physical capitals
are derived as in the previous section assuming local stability.
Although we can derive the optimal condition for the level of public
education in this economy as in Furumatsu (1997), our interest here is the
long run comparative dynamics effects of public education on the economy
consisting of heterogeneous individuals. We will examine in the next
section how public education affects the individual level of human capital,
and whether the income distribution is improved or not.
4. The effects of public education
4.1 The distribution effects
First, we examine the effects of public education on the steady state
income distribution. The introduction of public education shifts human
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capital formation function, changing the level of human capital in the
steady state. In the steady state, each individual's human capital and
asset should meet the following equations for a given g :
h (0) = A (h (O))'l/J(E (ze (0),0), h (0))
a(O) = a(ze (0),0)
for all 0,
for all 0,
(23)
(24)
where h (0) and a(O) are the values of human capital stock and asset for
each individual in the steady state.
Totally differentiating these two equations with respect to g and
taking account ofthe government budget constraint, we have
[
I - A ('l/Jl E1 (1 - a)w - 'l/Jz)
- al (1- a)w - A 'l/JI E
1 (1- a)(1 + r)] l~~]
I-al(1-a)(l+r) da
dg
da (dW dr) .where B(o) = ze(O)- - h(o)- + a(O)- . Solvmg eq. (25), we have
dg dg dg
dh (0) A 'l/JjE1(1 - B (0»)
dg - D (26)
da(O)
dg -
a\ (1 - A'l/Jz)(1 - B (0)
D
(27)
where D denotes the determinant of the coefficient matrix on the left-
hand side ofeq.(25), Le.,
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The local stability conditions mean that the sign of D is positive. ll
The term daldg in B((}) is deduced from the government budget
equation az = g, where z == Jz((})f((})d (} :
da - aZg + 1
dg z + az" '
which shows the change in the tax rate required to finance the increased
public education. Since we consider the effects of introducing public
education, we evaluate the derivatives at a = g = O. In this case,
d aldg = liz, and then the function B((}) can be expressed as follows:
ze((}) (dW dr)B((})=-- h((})-+a((})- .
z dg dg
(28)
In the following, we will examine how the effects of public education
differ among individuals according to their preference parameter for
education. The sign of eq. (26) is not assured, since the first term of the
numerator is positive but the second term can take either sign. This
means that introduction of public education does not always raise human
capital for each individual. To see the sign of eq. (26), we will notice the
level of B ((}). This term stands for the effects of public education on
individual income through the labor-capital markets and the government
budget. For the individuals whose B((}) is smaller than unity, eq. (26)
takes a positive sign, then introduction of public education accelerates the
accumulation of human capital. On the other hand, for the individuals
whose B ((}) is larger than unity, it is possible for introduction of public
-14-
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education to depress human capital accumulation. This case must be for
the individuals with the higher preference for education. It is because the
first term of B «(}) is increasing and the second term is likely to be non-
decreasing with (}.12 Therefore, we can say that the individual with the
higher preference for education has the larger possibility to depress
human capital accumulation. Then we can conclude that, otherwise being
equal, the distribution of human capital is possible to be more equalized
by introduction of public education in the long run. These conjectures are
also applicable to the sign of da«(})/dg.
Letting the disposable income be Zd ;: (1 - a)(wh + (l + r)a), we have
dZd «(}) (l - a)[(wA -rPIE\ + (l + r )aj (l - A -rPz»(l - B «(}))]
---
dg D
z«())
z
(29)
The interpretation of this equation is similar to the one for eqs. (26) and
(27). Then we can also conclude that the income distribution is possibly
more equalized by introduction of public education in the long run.
4. 2 The efficiency effects
Second, we consider another effect of public education on
accumulation of human capital. That is, we examine the possibility that,
due to the threshold effects, introduction of public education changes
radically the steady state to which the accumulation path of human
capital converges.
As is suggested in section 4. 1, introduction of public education will
shift the human capital function downward for the individuals whose B «(})
is larger than unity, that is, for ones whose preference parameter is
higher than that of the individual with the average level of income. For
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the individuals whose B «(J) is smaller than unity, the reverse will be the
case. However, it is not assured to which group (the higher, middle or
lower preference group) the individual with the average level of income
belongs, since it depends on the initial distribution of human capital and
the threshold point which are given exogenously. Therefore, it is possible
for public education to shift the human capital function either upward or
downward for individuals of all three groups, except an individual with
the highest preference in the higher preference group and the one with
the lowest preference in the lower preference group.
However, as will be made clear below, for individuals in the higher
preference group, the existence of the threshold point does not have any
substantial effect on the accumulation process of human capital when
public education shifts the human capital function upward. Similarly, for
the lower preference group, the downward shift of the human capital
function due to introduction of public education does not have any
substantial effect through the threshold effects. Therefore, in the
following discussions, we will not refer to these cases, assuming that the
average income individual belongs to the middle preference group.
The higher preference group
As noted in section 2. 3, individuals in this group have equilibrium
h«(J). When public education shifts the human capital formation function
downward, there may exist some individuals in the lowest end of this
group who enter the middle preference group. For these individuals, ifthe
initial level of human capital is lower than the threshold point h', the
accumulation path converges to the lower equilibrium /Lg «(J) instead of
h«(J) in Fig. 5. This means that public education causes substantial
-16-
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changes to lower the level of human capital of these individuals in the
longrun.
45'
--------- I
.. -- 'V
- - - - - -. with no public education
-- with public education
"'--------'---'-----o::-"------h,
l!'(IJ) h* h(lJ)
Fig. 5
The lower preference group
When public education shifts the human capital formation function
upward, there may exist some individuals in the highest end of this group
who enter the middle preference group. In the absence of public
education, an individual in this group has equilibrium !L<O). If the initial
level of their human capital is higher than the threshold point h', then
their human capital converges to the higher equilibrium level h (0) in Fig.
6 after introduction of public education. Public education brings about
radical impacts for these individuals on human capital accumulation in
the long run.
The middle preference group
Individuals in this group have two equilibria. Different from the
above two groups, however, in the case of the middle preference group, the
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45"
"-------'-------'--:::-------h,
iI(O) h* h'(O)
Fig. 6
existence ofthe threshold point has substantial impacts on human capital
accumulation whatever effects of public education are on the human
capital function. If public education shifts the human capital formation
function upward, some individuals in the highest end of this group may
become a member of the higher preference group after introduction of
public education. Then they have equilibrium hg (f) in Fig. 7-a. This
suggests that, for the individuals whose previous convergence state is the
lower equilibrium !:L«(), public education changes it to the higher one
-c
h «(}).
If public education shifts the human capital formation function
downward, individuals who belong to the lowest end of this group may
become a member of the lower preference group. In this case, the
convergence state becomes lower to !:Lg «() in Fig. 7-b, even if his previous
convergence state is h«().
Introduction of public education has various impacts on the level of
human capital in the long run for certain individuals in each group. These
-18-
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effects are brought about by the threshold effects in the human capital
formation function. Whether these effects increase the rate of growth of
the economy or not depends on the distribution of the preference
parameter.
L-------'--'-------'------h,
hU}) h* ii'CO)
Fig.7-a
.................. ,
.........//:.r==
"'-------'-----'-c'c-------h,
h'CO) h* liCO)
Fig.7-b
5. Concluding comments
In our model, we assume that individuals have different preferences
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for education which determine the level of human capital for children. If
educational provision relies entirely on the individual decision, education
would be insufficient to attain the efficient stock of human capital for a
society as a whole. Using an overlapping generation model, we have
analyzed how the introduction of public education exerts the different
effects on individual human capital accumulation and income depending
on the different educational preferences.
We have concluded particularly that the introduction of public
education can possibly make the distributions of human capital and
income more equal. This conclusion corresponds to a result in Eckstein
and Zilcha (1994) which analyzed the effects of compulsory education
using a model of heterogeneous individuals with different tastes
regarding the choice ofleisure and human capital.
We assume that the stock of a parent's human capital has the
threshold effect on the accumulation of a child's human capital. The
threshold effect may yield two equilibria. We showed that the
introduction of public education will make a substantial difference in the
convergence process, and that it is possible to change the level of human
capital and the efficiency ofthe economy radically in the long run
Appendix
Let us examine the stability conditions ofthe model. To simplify the expressions, we
omit the parameter when it does not make any confusion. To derive the local stability
conditions, we differentiate eqs. (17) and (18) in a neighborhood ofan equilibrium:
[
dht+l] = [A ('PiE,w +'Ih) A,p,Et(l +r)] [dht],
dat+t a,w at(l+r) dat
-20-
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where the number of subscript denotes the partial differentiation with respect to
corresponding variables. The characteristic polynomial of the matrix is
(A-2)
Conditions for this system to satisfy locally stable solutions are met if f(l) > 0 and the
value of A to minimize the function (A-2) is between zero and one, since the
characteristic polynomial has real roots and flO) > O. Then, we have
(I - A "'2)(1 - al(l + r)) - A "'IElw > 0,
A ("'IEIW +"'2)+al(l +r) < 2.
(A-3)
(A-4)
From eq. (A-3), we find that the first term is positive, that is, the signs of (1 - A "'2) and
(1- al(1 + r)) must be same, since A1/1IElw > O. Furthermore, eq. (A-4) is rewritten as
follows:
Since the left-hand side is positive, the right-hand side must be positive. The signs of
both terms on the right-hand side are same, so that we obtain the following conditions:
A 1/12 < 1, (A-5)
In a similar way, the local stability conditions of the model in the presence of
government intervention are obtained as follows:
and
(I - A 1/12)(1 - a,(I - 0')(1 + r)) - A ""EI(I - O')w > 0,
A("'IEI(1-O')w +1/I2)+al(1-0')(I +r) < 2,
(A-6)
(A-7)
A,p2 < 1, (A-8)
Footnotes
1) In Hare and Ulph (1979), the government determines the allocation of public
education among individuals according to their abilities taking into account their
expenditures on private education. On the other hand, in Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) and Zhang (1996), public education provides every child with education of the
same quality.
2) The joy of giving motivation has been discussed in the literature of bequest models.
See Abel and Warshawsky (1988), and Kohlberg (1976).
3) The lower and the upper bounds of the integrals are omitted to simplify the
expression.
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4) In human capital theory, the labor productivity of a worker is often assumed to be
equal to one's ability times the amount of human capital invested. Since we assume
that individual 'ability' to use his / her human capital is the same for all individuals,
labor in an efficiency unit is proportional to human capital. See Atkinson (1973),
Sheshinski (1972), and Hamada (1975).
5) We assume that .p is concave with respect to h, that is
.p1l(E,w)2 + .p,EIIW2 + 21/JztEtw + .p22 < 0, and that.p satisfies Inada conditions. We use
subscripts to denote differentiation with respect to corresponding variables.
6) Azariadis and Drazen (1990) defined threshold externalities of human capital in the
production function.
7) Futagami and Mino (1995) defined threshold externalities by the form of eqs. (15)
and (16) in the case of public capital.
8) Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) showed empirically that there are increasing returns
to the intergenerational production ofhuman capital.
9) This requires (1 -A.ptE,w)a2 < 0, where a2 = 8a180, as well as the assumption of
normal goods.
10) The price of public education and that of education purchased privately are both
assumed to be unity. Individuals cannot, however, buy or sell public education in the
market.
11) Local stability conditions when a = 0 are given in the Appendix.
12) The homogeneity of the production function means hdwldg +adrldg = O. Then, if
dw Idg S 0, which means that introduction of public education increases total human
capital, the second term in eq. (28) is non-decreasing with O.
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Abstract
We consider public education provided obligatorily and equally for all
individuals. It is usually said that compulsory public education ensures
an equal opportunity of education for all individuals and contributes to
human capital formation. We will discuss how the introduction of public
education affects human capital accumulation and income distribution
among heterogeneous individuals in an overlapping generation model.
Particularly, we discuss those effects on the long-run equilibrium of
individual human capital, considering the threshold effects of human
capital stock.
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